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Executive Summary
The existing financial system in the United States is not working for
Native Americans. The aggregate data on chronic Native American
poverty, unemployment, and lack of reservation business activity indicates
a substantial disconnect between tribal communities and traditional sources
of development capital such as banks, credit unions, and other commercial
lenders. Structural conditions in tribal communities do not embody the legal
elements or collateral base required by commercial banks to provide loans
and credit for Native American economic development. What tribal
communities need is a new financial system, built upon an understanding of
the unique economic and legal conditions of Native American nations, to
provide access to capital on terms that are structurally and culturally
consistent with the realities of Native American life.
This policy paper describes an innovative program to create a new
financial institution that can facilitate much-needed access to capital and
affordable financial services for Native American nations: the Tribally
Chartered Bank (TCB). The TCB would be a new banking system—rather
than a new bank under the existing system—that would be chartered under
tribal law and regulated by an independent tribally appointed governing
body. Organized under the sovereign authority of one or more tribal
governments and free from the short-term focus of publicly listed banks, the
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TCB would offer a means for tribes to secure the “patient capital” required
for long-term economic and infrastructure development.1 The potential
benefits of the TCB for Native American communities are substantial and
far-reaching, including:
! direct capital investment into reservation businesses, housing,
and infrastructure;
! a long-term approach to access and ROI on capital, designed
specifically for the Native American paradigm;2
! lending standards based on tribal needs and conditions, not bank
shareholder demands;
! opportunities to become the primary banking institution for
emerging businesses such as legal cannabis and online gaming;
! embracing a culture of creativity and innovation in financial
products, processes, and technology.
The TCB’s organizational structure and operational activities can be
designed for mutually beneficial integration into existing American/global
financial networks through:
! a compact for cooperative oversight with U.S. agencies,
providing transparency and legitimacy;
! utilizing existing and accepted financial infrastructure such as
SWIFT and NACHA; and

1. Patient capital “bridges the gap between the efficiency and scale of market-based
approaches and the social impact of pure philanthropy. Patient capital has a high tolerance
for risk, has long time horizons, is flexible to meet the needs of entrepreneurs, and is
unwilling to sacrifice the needs of end consumers for the sake of shareholders. At the same
time, patient capital ultimately demands accountability in the form of a return of capital:
proof that the underlying enterprise can grow sustainably in the long run.” See What Is
Patient Capital?, ACUMEN, http://acumen.org/ideas/patient-capital/ (last visited Jan. 17,
2017).
2. Return on Investment or “ROI” is commonly defined as the ratio of net income to
the average capital employed in an investment or enterprise.
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! deploying state-of-the-art FinTech to enhance efficiency and
reliability for transactions.
The TCB would be an institutional means for Native American nations
to address and improve the chronic conditions of poverty, unemployment,
and underdevelopment within their communities. Tribes would create the
financial system to recognize specific conditions and serve the unique needs
of their members. By providing support for the formation and operations of
the TCB, the U.S. government would also provide substantive redress for
its historical policies that have directly resulted in the deleterious economic
conditions experienced by tribes. In contrast with traditional banks that are
constrained by the legal strictures of federal or state charters, the TCB
would embody the beneficial flexibility of tribal laws and sovereignty, and
provide a powerful instrument for enhancing Native American selfdetermination.
I. Introduction
The economic and related development conditions of Native American
nations and their members chronically and severely lag behind accepted
standards for the rest of the United States. One-third of reservation-based
Native Americans fall below the poverty line, and aggregate Native
American unemployment is twice the U.S. average.3 Tribal governments,
“unable to spur economic development” within reservation territories and
operating without a typical municipal tax base, “struggle to provide even
the most basic services” and infrastructure.4 The significant and chronic
disparity in economic advancement between the Native American
population and the U.S. average is illustrated by comparative
unemployment rates, reflecting their progression prior to, during, and after
the recent “Great Recession”:

3. Poverty and Possibilities in Indian Country, FCNL INDIAN REP. (Friends Comm. on
Nat’l Legislation, Washington, D.C.), Spring 2012, at 1, http://fcnl.org/assets/pubs/indian_
report/IR_Spring_2012_d4.pdf; see also Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian
Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism Succeed? 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 758-59 (2001).
4. Jenny Small, Note, Financing Native Nations: Access to Capital Markets, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 463, 463-64 (2013); see Poverty and Possibilities in Indian Country,
supra note 3; Miller, supra note 3.
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Table 1. United States National Unemployment Rates

Note: “American Indian” refers to individuals identifying as American Indian or Alaska Native
alone or in combination with another racial category.
Source: EPI analysis of basic monthly Current Population Survey micro data.5

With these economic and human security conditions, it is little wonder
some commentators have described Native American nations as the “fourth
world.”6
A fundamental element for any economic development program is access
to capital, which makes purchases, investments, and asset building
possible—increasing and sustaining economic activity. Although the United
States controls more capital than any other nation, access to this capital is
uneven within the country and numerous communities struggle to obtain
funding for basic development.7 Nowhere is this inequality more starkly
evident than in Native American nations, where poverty, unemployment,
the prevalence of “food deserts,” and other symptoms of scarce capital
5. Algernon Austin, High Unemployment Means Native Americans Are Still Waiting
for an Economic Recovery, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.epi.org/
publication/high-unemployment-means-native-americans.
6. Small, supra note 4, at 473 (citing CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE
RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 271 (2006) (“However favorable the new legal and policy
framework might be, every Indian tribe in the postwar years faced challenges befitting a
third world nation—some have called aboriginal peoples the fourth world.”); Amar Bhatia,
The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to International Law with Lessons
from the Fourth World, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 131 (2012)).
7. John Cassidy, Piketty's Inequality Story in Six Charts, NEW YORKER (Mar. 26,
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/pikettys-inequality-story-in-six-charts.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

6

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

manifest at far higher rates than the national average.8 “According to a
report published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve . . . ,
‘insufficient access to capital’ . . . is a primary challenge” to economic
development in Native American nations.9
From Marx to Piketty, economists and scholars have understood the
importance—and bemoaned the unequal distribution—of global capital for
the better part of 200 years. Marx identified capital as a “social power,”
without which people “cannot become masters of the productive forces of
society.”10 In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Piketty recognizes that
“[b]efore production can begin, funds are needed for equipment and office
space, to finance material and immaterial investments of all kinds, and of
course to pay for housing.”11 For Native American communities, the
chronic lack of available capital has caused development to stagnate in all
of these basic elements of their economies.
One element of the inequality of capital distribution in the United States
is particularly unusual and counterintuitive from an economic perspective.
In general, having a presence within a particular territory for an extended
period of time is an advantage for a community of people in accumulating
capital available within that area.12 Yet in the United States, extreme
longevity of presence does not correlate with increased wealth—in fact, the
opposite has manifested. Native Americans resided within the territory of
the United States for thousands of years prior to European contact, yet
today the small amount of land and resources they own and control is
effectively “dead capital” that cannot be leveraged to create development
opportunities.13 In essence, those who have lived in the United States the
longest have accumulated the least, and for Native Americans this historical
8. Alysa Landry, What Is a Food Desert? Do You Live in One? 23.5 Million in this
Country Do, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Apr. 28, 2015), https://indiancountry medianetwork.
com/culture/health-wellness/what-is-a-food-desert-do-you-live-in-one-235-million-in-this-coun
try-do/.
9. Small, supra note 4, at 464 (quoting SUSAN WOODROW ET AL., GROWING ECONOMIES
IN INDIAN COUNTRY: TAKING STOCK OF PROGRESS AND PARTNERSHIPS 4-6 (Apr. 2012)
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System White Paper), http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/conferences/GEIC-white-paper-20120501.pdf).
10. KARL MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 65, 68 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1988)
(1848).
11. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 385 (2014).
12. Id. at 368-70.
13. Shawn Regan, 5 Ways the Government Keeps Native Americans in Poverty, FORBES
(Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/13/5-ways-the-governmentkeeps-native-americans-in-poverty/#61ad1ed36cc6/.
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anomaly has resulted in a situation where, according to Piketty, “[t]he past
devours the future.”14
For Native American nations, the lack of access to capital inhibits their
ability to finance new projects such as housing, business development, and
renewable energy that would benefit both the tribal communities and the
United States.15 “Yet, despite their difficulty in accessing capital,” Native
American nations possess “significant potential for economic growth”
based on untapped resources, land, and sovereignty.16 The transformative
opportunity embedded in this potential is beginning to inspire creative
approaches to new development pathways, with tribal finance expert Gavin
Clarkson identifying Native American nations as “America’s domestic
emerging market.”17 Harnessing this potential and implementing
development programs that can have a real impact on conditions within
tribal communities will require not only inventive thinking, but also the
creation of new and innovative economic institutions.
Commenting on the current state of global capital distribution, Bill Gates
has noted that “governments can play a constructive role in offsetting the
snowballing tendencies” of inequality in access to capital when they
embody the will to do so.18 In the government-to-government relationship
between the United States and Native American nations, the federal and
tribal governments have a mutual interest in facilitating the enhancement of
Native American economic and human security development. Moreover,
such work is directly connected to the U.S. government’s legal obligations
as a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.19 The Articles relating to economic development
address these obligations:
14. PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 571.
15. Small, supra note 4.
16. Id. at 464 (citing Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Ladine Oravetz, Tribal Economic
Development: What Challenges Lie Ahead for Tribal Nations as They Continue to Strive for
Economic Diversity?, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 443 (2001-2002) (“Sovereignty is
best defined as the vested powers of self-government, self-control, self-determination, and
self-actualization.”)).
17. Id. (quoting Gavin Clarkson, Accredited Indians: Increasing the Flow of Private
Equity into Indian Country as a Domestic Emerging Market, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 285, 285
(2009)).
18. Bill Gates, Why Inequality Matters, GATESNOTES: THE BLOG OF BILL GATES (Oct. 13,
2014), http://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Why-Inequality-Matters-Capital-in-21st-CenturyReview.
19. G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

8

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to
the improvement of their economic and social conditions,
including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment,
vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and
social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate,
special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their
economic and social conditions. . . .
....
Article 38
States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples,
shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative
measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.
Article 39
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and
technical assistance from States and through international
cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights contained in this
Declaration.20
The Declaration provides direct mandates (and in fact binding
obligations under international law) for the U.S. government to take official
action to facilitate improved economic development in tribal communities.
These general obligations provide a framework for the United States to
begin working with tribal governments on new policy initiatives to address
the specific deficiencies experienced by Native American nations in
accessing capital within existing financial systems, particularly in light of
the failings of those systems so glaringly exposed by the recent financial
crisis.
The systemic breakdown in U.S. and global finance that occurred during
the “Great Recession” period of 2007-10 revealed numerous weaknesses in
the structure and performance of existing financial institutions. Subsequent

20. Id. arts. 21, 38, 39.
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analysis of those weaknesses has produced policy recommendations for
improving the performance and equality of access to these institutions:21
! establish short, simple, and direct connections between financial
institutions and the end-users of capital;
! prioritize transactions that place capital into the hands of people
who will use it for on-the-ground development activities, rather
than transactions between financial institutions in pursuit of
corporate profits; and
! create specialized institutions with a direct focus on serving
specific types of capital users and needs, with business models
and institutional priorities based on meeting those needs.
These policy concepts are particularly relevant for addressing the
endemic problems Native American nations experience in accessing
sufficient capital to promote economic and human security development.
II. Challenges For Tribes In Accessing Capital
The problems Native American nations experience in accessing
development capital can be seen as arising from three primary causes: (1)
the historical and structural conditions of tribal communities; (2) the
unwillingness of commercial lenders and other mainstream capital sources
to conduct business with tribes and their members; and (3) the failure of the
U.S. government to uphold and properly manage its legal and trust
obligations to facilitate capital availability.22
A. Historical and Structural Problems
Thousands of years before Europeans first took to the sea in search of the
“New World,” the indigenous people of North, Central, and South America
had established unique and flourishing civilizations that stretched from the
Arctic Circle to Tierra Del Fuego. While the nations of Europe languished
in the Dark Ages, the indigenous nations of the Americas were creating
scientific, cultural, and architectural achievements that are marvelous to
ponder even today.23 A key element of the success of these societies was
21. JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 259-60 (2015).
22. For a further detailed discussion of access to capital issues in Native American
communities, see Small, supra note 4, at 467.
23. W. GREGORY GUEDEL, STRATEGIES AND METHODS FOR TRIBAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (2013).
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their economic activity, which involved trade with other indigenous nations
in combination with local endeavors that were harmonious with the natural
world and sustainable with available resources.24
The general picture of Native American political economy in the twentyfirst century is radically different from pre-Columbian times. The political
subjugation of indigenous nations by European colonizers, combined with
forced geographic dislocation from their ancestral lands and traditional
trading partners, essentially destroyed the original paradigm of economic
development in the Americas. Native American nations were forcibly
removed from their ancestral territories by the U.S. government, thereby
losing both the capital value of the land and the asset base of natural
resources associated with it. This dislocation deprived tribes of untold
billions of dollars’ worth of capital producing assets, and consigned them to
areas of the United States that were considered economically undesirable by
the U.S. government and American settlers.25
The land that Native American nations retained typically included
several conditions that prevent it from being effectively leveraged to obtain
development capital:
! reservations are often located in geographically isolated areas,
far from established commercial and population centers that
could provide a market base for tribal economic activity, and on
land that is commonly devoid of natural economic resources;26
! tribal lands generally have a “checkerboard” of varying title
status, limiting the ability of tribal governments and businesses
to put their lands into productive economic use;27 and
! a lack of infrastructure investment leaves many tribal nations to
cope with inadequate roads, utilities, and communication
networks for economic development.28
A further problem, and a puzzling irony, is inherent in the sovereign
lands owned by a tribal government itself. To ensure the protections of
24. Id.
25. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE (2005).
26. See The Poverty Cycle, RUNNING STRONG FOR AMERICAN INDIAN YOUTH,
http://indianyouth.org/american-indian-life/poverty-cycle (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
27. GUEDEL, supra note 23.
28. See Housing & Infrastructure, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.
org/policy-issues/economic-development-commerce/housing-infrastructure (last visited Jan.
17, 2017).
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tribal sovereignty and prevent alienation to third parties, lands the tribal
government holds title to are often converted into “trust land.”29 The U.S.
government acknowledges that it holds such land “in trust” for the tribe,
and thereby extends its own legal protections over the land against potential
creditors or other outside entities.30 Tribal governments, however, cannot
levy property taxes upon trust lands.31 This creates a “Catch-22” wherein
tribes must place their land into trust in order to fully assert their sovereign
jurisdiction over those lands, but by putting the land in trust they forfeit the
sovereign capital revenue of property taxes that could be derived from their
lands. Consequently, this deprives tribal governments of a stable (and often
sizeable) revenue source that is available to almost every other jurisdiction
in the United States to provide capital for infrastructure, essential services,
and community development.32
B. Commercial Capital Source Problems
Economists and development scholars have long recognized that “[f]or
any economy to grow, banking institutions must be available to help
provide individuals with standard loans, and provide small businesses and
industries with the necessary amount of capital to pay for wages, materials,
and other developmental costs.”33 Even the Federal Reserve has noted “the
shortage of banking institutions located near native communities as a
primary barrier to accessing capital markets.”34 In some communities,
Native Americans living on reservations may need to travel as far as thirty
29. Office of Trust Services, INDIANAFFAIRS.GOV, http://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWe
Are/BIA/OTS/index.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2016) (“The Office of Trust Services carries
out Indian Affairs trust responsibilities to Indian tribes and individuals and oversees all
headquarter activities associated with management and protection of trust and restricted
lands, natural resources, and real estate services.”).
30. Id.
31. Taxation, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/
tribal-governance/taxation (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) (“In general, tribal governments lack
parity with states, local governments, and the federal government in exercising taxing
authority. For example, tribes are unable to levy property taxes because of the trust status of
their land . . . .”).
32. Id.
33. Ansson & Oravetz, supra note 16, at 462.
34. Small, supra note 4, at 485-86 (citing WOODROW ET AL., supra note 9, at 4; Ansson
& Oravetz, supra note 16, at 462 (“In general, banking institutions have even failed to
establish banking facilities within Indian country. For instance, the Navajo reservation,
which has a population of more than 200,000 individuals, only has several banking facilities.
Meanwhile, a border town, such as Gallup, New Mexico, with a population of 20,000, has
almost three times as many as [sic] banks.”)).
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miles to access an ATM—a barrier known as the “buckskin curtain.”35 This
dearth of mainstream financial institutions has created a disproportionate
unbanked population and a vacuum into which predatory lenders such as
payday loan companies have moved, eroding tribal members’ personal
capital with high interest rates and fees.36 As a result, Native Americans
often find themselves in a negative cycle where they turn to predatory
lenders because they cannot connect with traditional lenders, and then they
become ineligible for future traditional lending due to their indebtedness to
the predatory lenders.37
Further still, Native-owned businesses that possess “adequate collateral
and good credit histories” struggle to obtain capital for operations and
expansion.38 For example, financing of more than $100,000 tends to be
difficult for Native Americans and tribal nations to obtain, reflecting a
seemingly unwritten risk-underwriting threshold beyond which most banks
are unwilling to lend.39 Even Native Americans with above average income
often have difficulty financing the purchase or improvement of a home, as
banks remain wary of any reservation based collateral for their loans.40
The unwillingness of the financial regulatory bodies to adopt policies
and procedures that account for the conditions of tribal communities
presents another significant barrier to capital access. On an institutional
level, Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 appears (intentionally or
otherwise) to preclude Native American nations from obtaining status as

35. Id. at 485 (citing Ronald A. Wirtz, Breaching the “Buckskin Curtain,” FED. RES.
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Sept. 1, 2000), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/theregion/breaching-the-buckskin-curtain).
36. See id. (citing FIRST NATIONS DEV. INST., BORROWING TROUBLE: PREDATORY
LENDING IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (2008)).
37. See id. (citing Predatory Lending in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 20 (2008) (“The effect of having a tribal population
unbanked and subject to predatory financial firms is that it strips an already vulnerable
population of the opportunity to advance by preventing them from building assets, equity
and wealth.”)).
38. See id. (quoting WOODROW ET AL., supra note 9, at 4).
39. See id. (citing OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INSIGHTS REPORT:
COMMERCIAL LENDING IN INDIAN COUNTRY: POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN A GROWING MARKET
(Feb. 2016), http://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/insights/insightscommercial-lending-indian-country.pdf).
40. See id. (citing Aaron Drue Johnson, Comment, Just Say No (to American
Capitalism): Why American Indians Should Reject the Model Tribal Secured Transactions
Act and Other Attempts to Promote Economic Assimilation, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 107, 117
(2010-2011)).
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“accredited investors.”41 The regulation thereby prevents tribal
governments from accessing and investing in various, potentially high
return financial vehicles, which further “inhibit[s] capital formation and
investment in Indian Country.”42 Tribes also do not qualify for exemption
from SEC registration for bond issues enjoyed by municipal, county and
state governments, thereby greatly inhibiting the raising of capital for street,
sewer, water facilities and other capital improvements in tribal
communities.43
A concurrent problem is that banks and other traditional capital sources
are reluctant to provide funding to tribal communities, as tribal sovereignty
precludes the use of standard financial security mechanisms such as
property liens, foreclosures, or repossession of goods.44 Tribal lands that
have been placed into trust status cannot be leveraged as collectible
collateral for bank financing, and the legal jurisdiction of tribal
governments generally prevents property seizures and sales by outside
commercial and law enforcement agencies.45 As a result, most American
financial institutions do not do business with tribes or lend money for
reservation business, housing, or other development activities, thereby
perpetuating the obstacles to economic progress in tribal communities.46
Despite federal incentives, non-native private lenders often forego
providing needed banking services to tribal members due to perceived
structural risks.47 The fear of sovereign immunity artificially raises the risk
profile of tribal borrowers in the eyes of traditional banks, as does a lack of
understanding of tribal law and legal systems.48 The inability of banks to
41. Clarkson, supra note 17, at 285; see Small, supra note 4, at 477. See generally
Accredited Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
accred.htm (last modified Oct. 21, 2014);
42. Small, supra note 4, at 477 (citing Native Am. Cap., LP, Policy Briefing: Native
American Tribes Require Reg D Change (n.d.), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/26523/nac020306.pdf).
43. Native Am. Cap., LP, supra note 42; see Small, supra note 4, at 477.
44. Small, supra note 4, at 488.
45. See id. at 473.
46. Id. at 494.
47. Id. at 488 (citing Susan Woodrow & Fred Miller, Lending in Indian Country: The
Story Behind the Model Tribal Secured Transaction Law, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2005,
at 38, 39, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2005/11/lendingindian-country-200511.authcheckdam.pdf).
48. See id. (citing Opportunities and Challenges for Economic Development in Indian
Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Baking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
52 (2011) (statement of Susan M. Woodrow, Community Development Advisor, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis) (“[L]enders and others face confusing and uncertain rules,
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utilize traditional default remedies such as foreclosure and repossession on
tribal lands also contributes to an industry-wide reluctance to finance
Native American development needs.49
C. Conflict of Law Problems
When banks provide loans to tribal borrowers, legal uncertainties often
manifest due to conflicts between the laws governing the activities of
federal or state chartered institutions and the sovereign legal status of tribal
nations.50 Issues of jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and available rights
and remedies outlined in financial agreements between banks and tribal
borrowers have resulted in varying court opinions that confuse rather than
clarify the legal landscape.51 It is well defined, however, that contemporary
banking law remains ill-equipped to deal with the sovereign status of
Native American nations and their affiliated enterprises.
A threshold challenge in applying existing financial laws to tribal
transactions is determining jurisdiction for disputes. The overlap of tribal,
federal, and state laws creates uncertainty regarding which courts can
exercise personal and subject matter jurisdiction when a tribal borrower has
a dispute with a federal or state chartered bank.52 In Cheyenne & Arapaho
Tribes v. First Bank & Trust Co., the Tenth Circuit ruled that the tribal
government borrowers waived their sovereign immunity from state court
jurisdiction by signing contracts with First Bank & Trust Company. That
court noted that while the Tribes’ accounts were subject to Oklahoma law
the state court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute because it was a
matter exclusively for tribal courts.53 The situation for banks is further
complicated when a borrower quit-claims or otherwise transfers its interest
in loan collateral to a tribal entity after the loan is made, leaving the bank to
deal with an ambiguous legal scenario outside the scope of the parties’
financing negotiations.54

and thus risky legal environments, that either deter them from doing business in Indian
Country or raise the costs of doing business in tribal jurisdictions.”)).
49. Jon Swann, Native American Bank: Banking the Unbanked, COMMUNITIES &
BANKING, Summer 2008, at 20, http://www.bostonfed.org/commdev/c&b/2008/summer/
swan_native_american_bank.pdf.
50. Small, supra note 4, at 494.
51. Id. at 488-89.
52. Id. at 488-93.
53. 560 F. App’x 699, 701 (10th Cir. 2014).
54. See Burley v. OneWest Bank, Civ. No. 2:14-1349 WBS EFB, 2014 WL 6835526
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2014).
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Current banking laws have difficulty accounting for complex multi-party
deals involving a lender, a tribe, and the U.S. government.55 Banks are
subject to uncertainty regarding whether the terms of a deal they make with
a tribe are enforceable if the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or other federal
agency also has an interest in the transaction. For example, a bank’s right to
apply the deposit of a depositor to offset that depositor’s debt has been held
to be limited once the bank has notice of a third party interest in the funds
on deposit.56 When a bank has knowledge that a third party, such as the
BIA, has an interest in funds deposited in the account of a tribal borrower,
the account must be considered special and the bank is prohibited from
exercising any claimed right of set-off.57 Banks are also precluded from
setting off the indebtedness of a tribal enterprise against tribal cash deposits
if the deposits are considered federal appropriations of revenue-sharing
funds between the United States and the tribe.58
In situations where a federal agency has an interest in a tribal transaction,
banks often find themselves limited in their ability to obtain relief from the
United States if the parties fail to fulfill contractual obligations. For
example, in Montana Bank of Circle, N.A. v. United States, the Court of
Federal Claims held: (1) the failure of the BIA and an Indian-chartered
corporation to enter a formal lease agreement underlying a bank loan was
not a breach of contract the bank could enforce; (2) the bank could not
recover as a third-party beneficiary; and (3) the statute requiring approval
of Secretary of the Interior and Commission of Indian Affairs for a contract
cannot be interpreted as mandating compensation by the United States for
losses suffered as a result of contracts with third parties that were
approved.59 Such uncertainties increase the risk profile for banks in
considering loans to tribes, thereby reducing the approval rates for tribal
loan applications.
Another uncertainty that shadows tribal lending is whether a particular
loan agreement is even enforceable in the first place. Banks have suffered
unexpected losses in tribal loan transactions when they subsequently
discovered that their agreement with the tribe lacked required approval
from the federal government. In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lake of the
55. Small, supra note 4, at 494.
56. Liberty Sav. Ass’n v. Sun Bank of Jacksonville, 572 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1978).
57. See United States ex rel. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Tri-County Bank of
Chamberlain, S.D., 415 F. Supp. 858 (D.S.D. 1976); see also Crow Tribe of Indians v. Little
Horn State Bank, No. 94-35391, 1995 WL 299886 (9th Cir. May 17, 1995).
58. Navajo Tribe v. Bank of New Mexico, 556 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.N.M. 1980).
59. 7 Cl. Ct. 601, 611, 614 (1985).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

16

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Torches Economic Development Corp., a trust indenture was held to be an
unapproved “management contract,” and was thus void under the Indian
Gaming Regulation Act.60 Lack of clarity as to which transactions may be
subject to tribe specific laws, such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
repeatedly results in wasted legal efforts by banks and the dismissal of
cases on jurisdictional grounds.61
Moreover, the First Circuit illustrated in Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key
Bank of Maine that tribes also experience uncertainty regarding federal
approvals and protections for their deals and assets.62 The Penobscot court
rejected the tribe’s assertion that a business loan for a fee simple land
purchase was unenforceable due to a lack of approval of the agreement
from the Secretary of the Interior under 25 U.S.C. § 81, holding that
reading § 81 to apply to Indian lands purchased in fee simple for
business reasons contradicts the statute’s purpose and its
drafters’ intentions. Even those courts that have propounded a
broad reading of § 81’s “relative to [Indian] lands” component,
moreover, have not found that this phrase refers to Indian fee
lands.63
It can also be difficult for banks to obtain viable security interests in tribespecific collateral such as an individual’s right to receive future per capita
payments, the issuance of which has been held to be a matter of exclusive
discretion for the tribal government.64
Banks and existing banking laws have chronically failed to recognize the
specific socio-economic conditions and needs within tribal communities.
Problematic federal laws struggle to allocate trust assets to Native
Americans based on troubling racial categorizations such as “mixedbloods” and “full-bloods.”65 Lack of experience on the part of traditional
60. 677 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1060-62 (W.D. Wis. 2010); see also Small, supra note 4, at
488-89. The trust gave unapproved third parties the authority to set up working policy for a
casino’s gaming operation in violation of federal statutes. Lake of the Torches, 77 F. Supp.
2d at 1060-62.
61. See id. at 1061; see also Wells Fargo Bank v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
No. EDCV 12-01278 VAP, 2012 WL 4718879, (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012); Small, supra note
4, at 488-89.
62. 112 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 1997).
63. Id. at 552 (citing United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1214
(7th Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Shakopee v. Pan Am. Mgmt. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1200,
1217-18 (D. Minn. 1985)).
64. DeCora v. DeCora (In re DeCora), 387 B.R. 230, 243 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2008).
65. See Hackford v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 521 F. Supp. 541 (D. Utah 1981).
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banks in handling trust funds and other restricted assets on behalf of Native
American children has long been a problem, resulting in allegations of
mishandling of trust obligations and illegal activity that deprives families of
much-needed financial assets.66 Banks in some cases have been held to only
nominal fiduciary standards in their dealings with tribal customers, being
obligated only to avoid “material deception” in handling tribal
transactions.67
Federal courts have also been part of the problem by frequently
demonstrating a distinct lack of understanding regarding the evolving
nature of tribal economics and business activities. For example, transactions
occurring off reservation are of increasing importance to tribal nations and
businesses, yet in Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court the District
Court of Montana denied relief sought by tribal borrowers in a repossession
case because “[t]his transaction occurred outside the exterior boundaries of
the reservation and is not of tribal importance.”68
Conflicts are presently emerging between state and Tribal laws regarding
short-term lending products, which are often provided to borrowers through
online portals accessible nationwide. These conflicts complicate the
electronic lending landscape within the United States and produce legal
actions that can require the participation of tribes in widespread
jurisdictions.69 Resolving the inherent legal conflicts between traditional
lenders and tribal borrowers calls for a new legal regime that can
adequately account for the sovereignty, legal status, and the unique
economic conditions of Native American nations.
D. U.S. Government Trust Management Problems
An exacerbating factor that compounds the financial struggles of Native
American nations is their inability to gain full access to capital and
economic resources they already own.70 Dating back to the nineteenth
century, the U.S. government has assumed a fiduciary trust responsibility
on behalf of Native American nations and their members to manage cash,
land, and natural resources worth tens of billions of dollars.71 Among the
66. United States v. Barnett, 7 F. Supp. 573, 576 (N.D. Okla. 1934).
67. Hackford, 521 F. Supp. at 550.
68. 690 F. Supp. 919, 922 (D. Mont. 1988).
69. See Otoe-Missouri Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105
(2d Cir. 2014) (detailing the issues involved in short-term lending operations conducted by
tribally owned businesses).
70. See Small, supra note 4, at 476.
71. Office of Trust Services, supra note 29.
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many trust activities it undertakes, the U.S. government leases surface use
and mineral rights on tribal property and is responsible for depositing the
monetary proceeds from such activities into capital accounts the United
States manages for tribes and individual Native Americans.72 In theory, this
trust concept was designed to protect tribes and their members from
exploitation by outside parties, and to help the tribal asset base grow for the
benefit of future generations. Unfortunately, the various federal agencies in
charge of trust assets have chronically mismanaged them, and the amount
of actual capital made available for beneficial use by tribal communities is
only a small fraction of the true value of the assets—effectively turning
those assets into “dead capital.”73
Prior to instituting the tribal “trust lands” policy (with its attendant
problems noted above), the U.S. government undertook a radically different
approach from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century. During this
“termination era,” the federal government sought to end tribal ownership of
land altogether through a policy that would create, in the words of President
Theodore Roosevelt, “a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal
mass.”74 The U.S. government ordered the “termination” of ownership of
lands by tribal governments, with fee simple ownership of those lands being
allotted in shares to individual tribal members. Two primary results
followed, both of which devastated the potential land-capital base of Native
American nations:
(1)

unscrupulous real estate speculators acquired (legally or
otherwise) vast tracks of the most desirable properties previously
owned by tribal governments and paid negligible value to tribal
members for their lands. This deprived tribal communities of
both the short and long-term capital value of the land that the
“termination” policy was ostensibly designed to provide; and

(2)

due to a failure of the U.S. government to provide an orderly
process for trans-generational ownership succession of allotted
tribal lands, the land that remained in tribal members’ ownership
became increasingly fractionated over time. Today, many

72. See Small, supra note 4, at 474-77.
73. Hernando de Soto, Dead Capital and the Poor, SAIS REV., Winter-Spring 2001, at
13, 17.
74. Teddy Roosevelt, INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE COMMONS. http://indigenous knowledge.
org/discussion/native-conversations/big-question-1-does-tribalism-have-a-valid-role-in-modernlife/post/teddy-roosevelt/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (excerpt from President Theodore
Roosevelt’s State of the Union Address, Dec. 3, 1901).
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parcels of land within reservations have dozens (sometimes
hundreds) of owners, each holding a small percentage of the
property title. This fractionation of ownership makes beneficial
economic use of the land almost impossible, as securing
sale/lease authorizations from so many owners is often
unattainable.75
Beyond the misguided and destructive policies regarding tribal lands, the
United States further deprived tribes of capital generated from their retained
territory. During the twentieth century and continuing today, the
Department of Interior has taken responsibility for stewarding the
oil/mineral leases and other resource-based revenue on over 56 million
acres of tribal land.76 The federal trust relationship requires the United
States to effectively manage the “acquisition, disposal, rights-of-way,
leasing and sales” of tribal land resources, and assist tribes “in the
management, development, and protection of trust land and natural resource
assets.”77 Unfortunately, gross mismanagement of these assets became the
norm, depriving Native American communities of vast sums of desperately
needed capital.
The most prominent example of trust mismanagement leading to the
destruction of Native capital is reflected in the recent “Cobell Settlement.”78
While serving as Treasurer of the Blackfeet Nation, Ms. Eloise Cobell
discovered irregularities in the federal management records of funds held in
trust by the United States for the benefit of hundreds of thousands of Native
Americans. In many instances, Ms. Cobell discovered no records at all.
Working with the Intertribal Monitoring Association, she attempted in the
1980s and 1990s to convince the responsible federal government agencies
of the need for procedural reform and an accounting of the trust funds.
When the reform effort failed to achieve progress, Ms. Cobell initiated a
class action lawsuit in federal court to force the administrative reform and
compel an accounting from the U.S. government of the trust funds
belonging to individual Native Americans.79

75. Small, supra note 4, at 471-73.
76. Q & A: Department of the Interior’s Final Leasing Reform, INDIANAFFAIRS.GOV,
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-037327.pdf (last visited Oct. 7,
2016).
77. Office of Trust Services, supra note 29.
78. See Small, supra note 4, at 474-77.
79. Complaint at 4, Cobell v. Babbitt, No. 1:96CV01285 (D.D.C. 1996),
http://www.indiantrust.com/docs/1996.06.10_Cobell_Complaint.pdf.
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After several trials over thirteen years, the federal agencies responsible
for managing trust funds for Native Americans effectively admitted they
could not produce a reasonable accounting of their actions.80 It was clear
from the evidence that for decades, billions of dollars in revenue collected
by the government—money that was gained from the lease of tribal lands
that should have gone into trust for native people—had simply
disappeared.81 The exact amount of money that was unaccounted for has
never been determined, due primarily to the government’s failure to keep
even basic records of the business transactions occurring on tribal lands.
Ultimately, the Cobell trust litigation was resolved in a settlement whereby
the U.S. government pledged a total of $4.3 billion in restitution and
supporting programs for tribal communities—but the average settlement
payment check received by individual Native Americans was only $1,000.82
The inability of Native American nations to unlock and utilize capital
that should be available to them has severely limited their development
progress. The combination of these structural, commercial, and intergovernmental factors has brought the lack of available capital for tribal
communities to a point of socio-economic crisis. In response, in 2015 the
United States Senate conducted hearings to investigate the problems and
seek pathways toward solutions.
III. United States Senate Oversight Hearing on Access to Capital in Indian
Country
On June 17, 2015, the United States Senate conducted a public inquiry
entitled the “Oversight Hearing on Accessing Capital in Indian Country.”
The purpose of the hearing was to explore means for tribes “to improve
access to capital and their experiences working with Federal partners” and
“help Indian communities to prosper and to enjoy healthier lives.”83 The
Oversight Hearing was chaired by Senator John Barrasso (R-Wyoming),
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, and participants
included Senator Michael Crapo (R-Idaho), Senator Al Franken (DMinnesota), Senator Jon Tester (D-Montana), Alejandra Castillo (National
80. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Cobell v. Kempthorne, Civial Action
No. 96-1285 (JR) (Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.indiantrust.com/docs/oct_trial.pdf
81. Id.
82. GUEDEL, supra note 23.
83. Accessing Capital in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Hearing: Accessing Capital], http://www.indian.
senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CHRG-114shrg97306.pdf (opening statement of
Sen. John Barrasso, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
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Director, Minority Business Development Agency), Derek Watchman
(Chair, National Center for American Indian Enterprise Development),
Ross Hill (CEO, Bank2), and Dante Desiderio (Executive Director, Native
American Finance Officers Association).84
The Oversight Hearing produced a number of key findings regarding the
current state of capital access for Native American nations:
! Economic development and the capital necessary for that
development are significant needs in Native communities. This
development relies on capital to start, support, and maintain
businesses of all sizes;
! Native and tribal-owned businesses face unique challenges
beyond those that non-native businesses in general face. For
example, many tribes are located in remote areas, far away from
transportation, distribution, or communication systems suitable
for sustainable commerce;
! Individual Native Americans do not own as many small
businesses compared to other demographic groups. For the most
part, they also do not receive business or financial assistance
from tribes. Native-owned businesses, however, tend to employ
more people than those operated by small business owners in
other demographic categories, thereby offering a greater
potential impact on employment levels if adequately funded for
growth; and
! Cost-effective capital for Native American nations is lacking in
both access and effectiveness in meeting the intended purposes,
i.e., the limitations on the use of capital imposed by lenders
render tribes unable to deploy it where it is needed most.85
The testimony of the Senators and witnesses participating in the
Oversight Hearing provided further insight into the specific conditions and
challenges Native American nations and their members confront in seeking
capital to advance their development programs. The clear consensus from
the Oversight Hearing is that a substantial and urgent need for increased
access to capital exists for tribal communities, as the mainstream financial
institutions and federal government programs have chronically proven
themselves inadequate in providing funding opportunities for economic and
84. Id. at III.
85. Id. at 1-2.
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community development. The findings of the U.S. Senate mandate a new
and more effective institutional and government-to-government partnering
approach for increasing the capital available to Native American nations.
IV. A Sovereign Solution – The Tribally Chartered Bank
In order to overcome their chronic lack of access to capital, Native
American nations cannot hope to rely on improvements within the existing
financial systems. Indeed, the structural format and economic priorities of
those systems virtually ensure the continuation of the status quo, where
tribal communities are overlooked, underserved, and struggle to obtain
negligible amounts of capital to advance their development. Native
American nations must therefore disrupt this inertia by introducing a new
dynamic element into the landscape of financial institutions.
To that end, a new Tribally Chartered Bank system (TCB) could provide
an innovative solution to the problem of insufficient capital for tribal
development within for tribal communities.86 This Section describes the
legal basis, organizational structure, and potential benefits of the TCB for
Native American nations, their partners, and the tribal citizens they
represent.
A. Concept Plan and Benefits
The TCB is a proposed banking system—rather than a new bank under
the existing system—that would be chartered under tribal law and regulated
by a tribally appointed governing body. Organized under the sovereign
authority of one or more tribal governments and free from the short-term
focus of publicly listed banks, the TCB would offer a means for tribes to
secure the “patient capital” required for long-term economic and

86. The TCB project concept is developing under the leadership of economic advisor J.D.
Colbert, whose past positions include serving as President of Native American Bank, N.A. and
as Bank Examiner for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. See David Melmer, A Conversation
with Chickasaw/Creek J.D. Colbert of Native American Bank, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK (Mar. 29, 2006), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2006/03/29/conversa
tion-chickasawcreek-jd-colbert-native-american-bank-106156. The TCB structure and
operational approach described in this article is founded upon Colbert’s presentation
“Establishing a Sovereign Financial System” at the University of Washington Jackson School
of International Studies Tribal Development Colloquium, held on May 28-29, 2015. See Foster
Pepper PLLC Videos, Native American Colloquium: Establishing a Sovereign Financial
System, YOUTUBE (June 8, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ad5q2Zs_csM
&feature=youtu.be (address by J.D. Colbert).
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infrastructure development. The potential benefits of the TCB for Native
American communities are substantial and far-reaching, including:
! direct capital investment into reservation businesses, housing,
and infrastructure;
! a long-term, “patient capital” approach to access and ROI on
capital investments, designed specifically for the Native
American paradigm;
! lending standards based on tribal needs and conditions, not bank
shareholder demands;
! facilitation and leveraging of existing federal loan guarantee
programs for tribal communities;
! opportunities to become the primary banking institution for
emerging businesses such as legal cannabis and online gaming;
and
! embracing a culture of creativity and innovation in financial
products, processes and technology by the TCB and the tribal
bank regulatory body.
The TCB’s organizational structure and operational activities can be
designed for mutually beneficial integration into existing American/global
financial networks through:
! compacting for cooperative oversight with U.S. agencies,
providing transparency and legitimacy;
! utilizing existing and accepted financial infrastructure such as
SWIFT and NACHA; and
! deploying state-of-the-art FinTech to enhance efficiency and
reliability for transactions.
The TCB would be an institutional means for Native American nations
to address and improve the chronic conditions of poverty, unemployment,
and underdevelopment within their communities. By providing support for
the formation and operations of the TCB, the U.S. government would also
provide substantive redress for its historical policies that have directly
resulted in the deleterious economic conditions experienced by tribes. In
contrast with traditional banks that are constrained by the legal strictures of
federal or state charters, the TCB would embody the beneficial flexibility of
tribal laws and sovereignty, and provide a powerful instrument to enhance
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Native American self-determination.87 Banks chartered as a TCB would
also be able to organize as tribal 17 corporations to limit their tax exposure
and gain a competitive financial advantage.88
Banks chartered under tribal law would be imbued with the sovereign
powers and immunities of tribal governments, allowing them to participate
in emerging economic opportunities such as online gaming and cannabis
retailing that federal law currently either explicitly or effectively prohibits
for federal and state chartered banks.89 Businesses conducting these
activities would generate cash that is presently “unbankable,” as federal
regulations either prohibit or otherwise dissuade traditional commercial
banks from accepting deposits from these forms of commerce.90 A TCB
chartered under sovereign tribal law, however, could become the primary
depository agency for these funds, in a manner consistent with the United
87. For a detailed discussion of innovative approaches to structuring tribal banking
enterprises, including the use of Section 17 corporations and tribally owned holding
companies, see Small, supra note 4.
88. GUEDEL, supra note 23, at 99-104; see Small, supra note 4, at 504.
89. See David Kelly, Limited by U.S. Banking Rules, Pot Businesses Rely on Bags of
Cash and Armed Guards, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-napot-banking-20151219-story.html.
“Banks face a number of risks if they choose to serve the industry, up to and
including closure of their institutions,” said Amanda Averch, Director of
Communications for the Colorado Bankers Assn. “Regulators can impose civil
money penalties, cease-and-desist orders, fines and can ban bankers from their
careers for life.”
Id.
90. Online Gambling: Don’t Roll the Dice, ARCHIVES.FBI.GOV (June 6, 2007),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2007/june/gambling_060607.
“You can go to Vegas. You can go to Atlantic City. You can go to a racetrack.
You can go to those places and gamble legally. But don’t do it online. It’s
against the law,” says Leslie Bryant, head of our Cyber Crime Fraud unit at FBI
Headquarters.
....
We’ve also had success against companies supporting the money flows behind
virtual gambling. In January, for example, two Canadians were charged with
operating an Internet payment services company that transferred billions of
dollars in illegal gambling proceeds between U.S. citizens and the owners of
online gambling sites outside the country.
In 2003, another Internet financial services company paid $10 million in a civil
agreement to settle allegations that it aided illegal offshore and online gambling
agreements. The U.S. government has also settled several cases with online
businesses that have accepted money to market virtual gambling operations.
Id.
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States Department of Justice mandate that tribal commerce related to such
activities “contain robust controls and procedures.”91
Two graphs illustrate the scale of the current and projected revenue from
online gaming activity and legal cannabis sales and the corresponding
economic opportunity for the TCB to service these revenue streams:
Table 2

Table 3

91. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
all U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
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These two activities are generating billions of dollars of revenue each
year—almost none of which is being put to constructive use in the existing
U.S. banking system. With federal and state chartered banks unable or
unwilling to accept deposits from these economic activities, the billions of
dollars in annual revenue generated from the activities instead circulates
untraceably within the “cash economy,” an unregulated realm of finance
that presents public safety challenges and is highly inconvenient for
legitimate commercial actors.92
Substantial portions of gaming and cannabis funds are also being
channeled to off-shore accounts or money-laundering schemes, creating a
huge problem for U.S. law enforcement.93 The United States Department of
Justice is now specifically seeking to partner with tribal governments in
“[p]reventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal
enterprises, gangs, and cartels.”94 The tribal governments organizing the
TCB could help resolve these problems by entering into a compact for
cooperative oversight with U.S. financial agencies for depository receipts
and reporting, thereby taking these billions of dollars out of the hands of
foreign and/or or unlawful entities and placing them into a legitimate and
regulated “on-shore” bank.
The direct and potentially gigantic financial benefit for Native American
nations would be the TCB’s ability to generate fee revenue from the
financial services it provides to these areas of commerce and to leverage the
cash deposits to provide the source capital for financing development in
tribal communities.
B. Strategic Approach
The purpose of the TCB would not be to compete with existing banks
and replicate their standard activities, which have obviously fallen short in
92. See Editorial, The Perils of Pot’s Cash Economy, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016, 5:00
A.M.), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-prop64-banking-20161019-snap-story.
html.
93. James Jarman, Marijuana Banking, Money Laundering, and the Government,
KRDO.COM (July 15, 2016, 5:48 AM MDT), http://www.krdo.com/news/local-news/mari
juana-banking-money-laundering-and-the-government-/35606891
94. Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys, First Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Criminal Chiefs,
Appellate Chiefs, OCDETF Coordinators, Tribal Liaisons, Policy Statement Regarding
Marijuana Issues in Indian Country (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/tribal/pages/attachments/2014/12/11/policystatementregardingmarijuanaissuesinindianc
ountry2.pdf.
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funding Native American development. Instead, the TCB should focus on
filling the void commercial banks have created through their lack of service
to tribal communities,95 and utilize electronic technology in lieu of costly
(and commercially unnecessary) physical infrastructure for facilitating
capital transactions.
To that end, the TCB from conception should adopt three strategic
priorities for improving tribal access to capital:
(1)

create a culture of financial innovation, for both the scope of
services to tribal communities and the delivery methods for those
services;

(2)

provide banking services to under/unbanked areas of lawful
commerce, including traditionally overlooked customers in tribal
communities and new emerging ventures (e.g., online gaming &
legal cannabis); and

(3)

emphasize “real time” electronic payments and settlements,
employing affordable and readily upgradeable internet-based
technologies.

Building a network of traditional brick-and-mortar depository banks
accessible to all 566 federally recognized tribes would be too expensive and
take too long to have a real impact within a relevant time period. Instead,
the TCB can utilize electronic payment technology to leap forward into
next-generation banking activities, and use internet-based access to connect
with the multitude of Native American nations. In lieu of expensive multistate marketing campaigns, the TCB can partner with national tribal
organizations such as the National Congress of American Indians and the
Native American Finance Officers Association to help inform tribal
communities of the TCB’s programs.
For tribes whose economic prospects have been limited by geographic
isolation, the ability to participate in the global economy through electronic
financial transactions via a tribally chartered bank presents the opportunity
to engage with potentially limitless customers who need never set foot on
the reservation. By combining the new legal regime of a tribal banking
charter with existing technology and inherent tribal sovereignty, Native
American nations can obtain capital on their own terms for investing in
self-directed economic development. The initial step in the institutional

95. See Small, supra note 4, at 509.
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formation of the TCB is for the sponsoring tribe(s) to adopt a Tribal
Banking Code and create a Tribal Banking Commission.
C. The Tribal Banking Code, Tribal Banking Commission, and TCBs
The foundational legal element for the structure and operations of the
TCB will be a new Tribal Banking Code—a set of laws that authorize the
TCB’s creation and govern its activities. The sponsoring tribe(s) for the
TCB would undertake the formation of the Tribal Banking Code as a
sovereign political action, ratified in accordance with the required
procedures in the applicable tribal Constitution(s). Although the Tribal
Banking Code could be established as an independent body of sovereign
tribal law, the existing banking codes for federal/state chartered banks
should be studied for best practices and guidance. These banking codes
would help to smooth the process for acceptance of the TCB into global
financial networks.96 Key elements and priorities for an effective Tribal
Banking Code include:
! threshold standards for capitalization and organization of TCB
operations;
! transparency, conflict of interest, and insider-dealing regulations;
! consumer protection and public disclosure requirements;
! compliance standards for protecting customer privacy and
account security ;
! rigorous but efficient bank examination protocols; and
! regular evaluations and CAMELS-type ratings of all TCB
institutions.97
Although the TBC would follow tribal law, tribal legislatures should
consult with U.S. banking regulators and incorporate appropriate provisions
for compliance with major U.S. federal banking laws into the Tribal
96. Information regarding structural models and baseline requirements for new banking
ventures is discussed in detail in OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL: CHARTERS (Sept. 2016), http://www.occ.treas.gov/
publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/charters.pdf.
97. The FDIC’s Uniform Financial Institution Rating System applicable to U.S.chartered banks utilizes financial assessment categories known by the acronym
“CAMELS” – Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to
Risk. See Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 62 Fed. Reg. 752 (Jan. 6, 1997),
https://www. fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/UFIR.pdf.
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Banking Code. Of particular importance will be compliance with the AntiMoney Laundering Act, the Bank Secrecy Act, the PATRIOT Act, and
Know Your Customer rules.98 This approach will acknowledge the practical
reality of the dominant status of U.S. regulations in the global financial
system, increase opportunities to obtain beneficial technical assistance from
federal agencies, and help accelerate the implementation and acceptance of
the TCB into global payment and credit systems.
The Tribal Banking Code could create the structural framework for the
TCB system through the establishment of a Tribal Banking Commission
that will be empowered with supervisory and regulatory authority over the
banking entities chartered in accordance with the Tribal Banking Code. The
Tribal Banking Commission will be an independent regulatory body of the
tribal nation(s) sponsoring the TCB system; it will be imbued with the
sovereign powers and immunities of the tribal government(s) and will have
responsibility for the creation, regulation, and regular examination of TCBs.
The initial Commission could be established with a Governing Board
consisting of approximately five to seven members, appointed pursuant to
the tribe’s internal processes for board appointments and with the
experience qualifications specified by the sponsoring tribe(s).99 Ideal Board
members for the Tribal Banking Commission will have significant prior
experience with commercial banking, banking law, and/or service with a
federal or state bank regulatory agency.
The Tribal Banking Commission could also appoint a Bank
Commissioner—the Tribal Banking Commission’s day-to-day operations
manager and primary public figure. An early priority for the Tribal Banking
Commission and its Commissioner should be the pursuit of a Cooperative
Oversight Agreement (Compact?) with U.S. banking regulators in order to
coordinate on a co-regulation regime that will strengthen the legitimacy of
the TCB system by providing access to federal investigative and
enforcement resources for legal compliance issues.100 In addition to its
98. FOREST E. MYERS, BASICS FOR BANK DIRECTORS 5-19 (4th ed. 2005).
99. The qualifications and integrity of the members of the Governing Board are a
crucial element for the successful launch and management of the TCB. The process for
vetting potential appointees to the Governing Board should prioritize review of each
candidate’s experience in banking operations, regulatory compliance, and detailed
understanding of both applicable Tribal and federal laws regarding bank chartering.
100. Co-regulation is a standard aspect of U.S. and global financial systems, and is
gaining increased prominence due to the proliferation of domestic and international financial
vehicles and regulations. See, e.g., Sophie Baker & Anish Puaar, Market Infrastructure
Firms Urged to Take a ‘Co-regulation’ Approach, FINANCIAL NEWS (Sept. 18, 2013), http://
www.efinancialnews.com/story/2013-09-18/sibos-2013-market-infrastructure-coregulation
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institutional duties, the Tribal Banking Commission should envision and
foster a culture of innovation and creativity in the financial products,
processes, and service delivery of the banks it charters.
The Tribal Banking Commission should be organized to be financially
self-supporting and self-sustaining, with revenue derived through fees and
assessments levied upon the banks it charters. This will be accomplished
within the Commission’s primary activity: issuing bank charters to Tribally
Chartered Banks. The TCBs will be the entities that directly manage the
capital within the TCB system, provide the public interface for the system,
facilitate payments and deposits, and act as the vehicle for providing access
to capital for development in tribal communities.
The initial TCBs will be organized as part of the overall creation of the
TCB system, and will connect directly with the sponsoring tribe(s). The
Tribal Banking Commission may also charter TCBs that are formed and
owned by other federally recognized Indian tribes. Any TCBs formed by
other tribes and chartered by the Tribal Banking Commission shall be
subject to the supervisory, regulatory, and examination authority of the
Commission.
Table 4. TCB Governance and Regulatory Structure

(“Because the financial industry is so busy following one regulation after the other, it has no
time, money or resources to go into market requirements. . . . We need to go for coregulation, where the regulator and the financial industry sit together and define the rules
and regulations.”) (quoting Michael Steinbach, chief executive and chairman of the board of
directors at the Dutch payment processing firm Equens SE).
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The primary mission of the TCB system is to facilitate increased access
to capital for tribal communities. An integral part of the program for
achieving this mission is facilitating existing capital access programs. As
noted during the U.S. Senate Oversight Hearing, there are numerous federal
programs that offer loans, loan guarantees, and other financing vehicles for
Native American development projects on favorable terms.101
In addition to the BIA, funding programs specifically designed for
Native American nations are offered by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Energy, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, the Economic Development Agency, the Department
of Veterans Affairs, and many others.102 These programs are, however,
chronically underutilized and have never come close to achieving their full
potential. Two primary reasons for this failing are: (1) a lack of general
knowledge about the programs within the commercial lending community
and (2) a lack of experience, and/or will, of commercial lenders in fulfilling
the federal requirements and procedures to access the programs.103 The
TCB will be uniquely placed to fill this gap. It should emphasize
communication and partnering with federal agencies that provide financing
support for tribal development, and in the process become the one-stopshop where tribal communities can learn about and participate in the
various funding programs the U.S. government offers.
In order to efficiently achieve the goal of facilitating increased access to
capital for Native American nations, TCBs must adopt a “cutting edge” and
“lean-and-mean” approach to the scope of services they provide. Investing
capital to create traditional brick-and-mortar banking infrastructure will
reduce the amount of capital TCBs can invest back into tribal communities,
thereby undermining the driving purpose for the program. To alleviate that
issue, TCBs could initially be conceived as limited purpose banks focusing
on advanced electronic commerce, including serving as a preferred platform
for electronic payments and fund transfers for commercial and individual
customers.

101. Hearing: Accessing Capital, supra note 83.
102. Federal Loan Programs for Economic and Community Development Throughout
Indian Country and Alaska, BIA.GOV (Aug. 2012), http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xieed/
documents/document/idc-022680.pdf.
103. Hearing: Accessing Capital, supra note 83.
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D. Twenty-first Century E-Commerce
The rapidly changing nature of the ways people handle money in every
day transactions presents a prime opportunity for the TCB concept. Instead
of withdrawing cash from the bank before making subsequent purchases,
people now simply place a card, phone, or watch next to an electronic
terminal at the shop checkout counter. Increasingly, individuals do not even
leave home to make such purchases. Instead, they use web portals such as
Amazon to buy everything from gifts to groceries; even high-capital
transactions such as mortgage loans are often completed entirely via
electronic communication.104 By focusing on the high technology/low
infrastructure model of commerce, the TCB can participate efficiently in
the current and emerging electronic capital transactions that will be
dominant throughout the twenty-first century.
The TCB’s initial primary commercial activities should focus on realtime electronic fund transfers, payments, and receipts. Utilizing
technologies to facilitate instantaneous electronic payments and transfers of
funds could enable the TCB to quickly integrate into fee-generating
commerce streams including debit card networks; VISA, MasterCard, and
American Express systems; the use of e-mail/e-transfer to make instant
payments; membership in the NACHA electronic payments association, the
Federal Reserve wire system, and the Depository Trust Company; and retail
payment networks such as Apple Pay and PayPal.
Focusing on electronic capital transfers will also position TCBs for
participation in the emerging e-currency commerce based on block chain
platforms such as Bitcoin.105 Focusing on e-commerce for fee generation,
rather than the traditional banking approach that bases revenue on interest
charges of loans will be advantageous to the operations and growth of
TCBs in numerous ways, including:
! a reduced credit risk profile for bank assets needed to sustain
operations;
! lower reserve capital requirements related to operational assets;
and
104. The author recently refinanced a home mortgage without ever setting foot in a bank
or escrow office, and with all communication, document execution, and payment transfers
accomplished via the internet.
105. Lynnley Browning, Oglala Sioux Hope Bitcoin Alternative, Mazacoin, Will Change
Economic Woes, NEWSWEEK.COM (Aug. 14, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
2014/08/22/tribe-brought-you-custers-last-stand-sitting-bulls-bitcoin-264440.html.
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! the ability to maintain smaller Allowance for Loan and Lease
Losses (“ALLL”) than peer institutions.106
The emphasis on electronic fee-for-service to produce topline revenue
also reflects the specific realities of the TCB’s mission to serve the needs of
Native American nations. The “patient capital” TCBs will provide to
finance tribal development projects will need to be structured on long-term
payback timeframes and below-market interest rates. Thus, the fee revenue
from e-commerce will be the TCBs’ primary profit engine, allowing the
TCBs to provide tribal development financing on lower-profit terms that
traditional banks refuse to offer.
E. Innovation and FinTech Partnering
Serving as the foundation for advanced commerce requires the TCB to
incorporate forward-looking technology in all of its operations. The key to
successfully implementing the vision of creating a nimble and efficient
electronic commerce enterprise is for TCBs to partner with financial
technology firms (“FinTech”) that are rapidly and constantly innovating
financial products. FinTech companies are currently offering systems
designed to move money rapidly across a variety of mobile platforms; the
companies also focus their business models on connecting their technology
with global financial systems and the attendant payment and settlement
regimes.107 These technologies facilitate rapidly growing consumer demand
for same-day payments and settlements, mobile banking and mobile
payments, seamless integration of technological platform, and timely
financial transaction reporting and tracking.
Because only the very largest banking institutions can afford to develop
their own proprietary IT platforms and functionality, the majority of
financial institutions rely wholly upon third party FinTech providers for
their core IT processing and transaction platforms.108 With little to no
106. The ALLL is a calculated reserve that financial institutions establish in relation to
the estimated credit risk within the institution’s assets. This credit risk represents the chargeoffs that will most likely be realized against an institution’s operating income as of the
financial statement end date. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interagency
Policy Statement on the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses at 2 (OCC Bulletin 2006-47,
Dec. 13, 2006), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2006/bulletin-2006-47a.pdf.
107. Maria Aspan, Why Fintech Is One of the Most Promising Industries of 2015, INC.
MAG. (Sept. 2015), http://www.inc.com/magazine/201509/maria-aspan/2015-inc5000-fintechfinally-lifts-off.html.
108. Id. The market for Core IT processing and electronic platform systems for banking
is one dominated by four FinTech companies: FIS, Fiserv, D+H and Jack Henry. Penny

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

34

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

control over the core-processing platform for their financial transactions
and standard services, the average bank has a difficult time obtaining a
competitive advantage in the market because it lacks the ability to
positively differentiate their products and services. The TCB’s inherent
competitive advantage of tribal sovereignty, however, presents an attractive
new opportunity for FinTech companies to become market leaders—
particularly by providing electronic systems to facilitate the previously
discussed “unbankable” commerce the TCB is intended to capture.
The chance to become the leading provider in these emerging industries
is a lucrative proposition for FinTech providers, and the TCB could
leverage this unique opportunity to create beneficial long-term partnerships
with FinTech firms and obtain cutting-edge technology at an affordable
price.
F. TCB Organizational and Chartering Process
The creation of a paradigm-shifting financial system like the TCB
requires a methodical approach for initiating and performance-testing each
aspect of the organization structure and operational activities as they come
into being. The overall process for organizing the TCB system from
conception to operational status is illustrated in the following flowchart:
Table 5. TCB Organizational and Chartering Process

Crosman, Can Big Four Core Banking Vendors Oligopoloy Be Broken?, AM. BANKER (Oct.
7, 2013), 12:45 PM EDT), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_194/can-big-fourcore-banking-vendors-oligopoly-be-broken-1062654-1.html. Beyond the core systems,
“middleware” systems offered by FinTech firms such as Yantech, Moven, Stripe, Square,
Inc., iZettle AB, [BrainTree, Balanced Payments, and Standard Treasury provide financial
institutions with APIs (application program interface) to develop end-user applications to
facilitate capital transfers, mobile banking and payments, e-commerce, and personal
financial money management.
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The timeline for initiation and completion of the required milestones
would depend upon and be impacted by numerous factors such as the
tribe’s legislative process and the timeframe for negotiating a compact for
cooperative oversight with the U.S. government, but the successful
completion of a given stage should increase the overall project momentum,
e.g. creating a sound Tribal Banking Code would help attract experts to
serve on the Tribal Banking Commission. The crucial first steps of
establishing the legal codes and regulatory structure for the TCB system
could be undertaken immediately and solely by the sponsoring tribe(s),
thereby enabling the process to move forward without reliance upon outside
parties or waiting for an alignment of favorable circumstances.
G. SWOT Analysis for the Tribally Chartered Bank
The TCB system is a new and ambitious enterprise, and should be
rigorously scrutinized at the conceptual and operational level to determine
its viability. A SWOT analysis provides a structured planning method to
evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats involved in a
project or in a business venture. For the Tribally Chartered Bank project,
the SWOT analysis can be structured using the following categories:
Strengths: characteristics of the TCB that give it an advantage
over others;
Weaknesses: characteristics that
disadvantage relative to others;

place

the

TCB

at

a

Opportunities: elements in the environment that the TCB could
exploit to its advantage;
Threats: elements in the environment that could cause trouble
for the TCB.
SWOT analysis for the TCB reveals numerous dynamic factors in each
category:
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Strengths
! tribal sovereignty provides legal basis for competitive market
advantages;
! self-regulation allows TCBs to set credit standards appropriate for
tribal communities;
! tax advantages of tribal status enhance positive revenue margins;
! ability to pursue presently unbanked revenue streams;
! immediate appeal for participation by 566 Native American nations;
! electronic service platform provides agility to predict/serve new
commerce trends;
! avoiding brick-and-mortar branch model allows for low Capex costs;
! fee-for-service revenue reduces reliance upon deposit and loan
generation;
! shortened time to profitability because of lower overhead costs; and
! ability to provide “patient capital” to tribes through customized
financing terms.

Weaknesses
! unprecedented endeavor with no equivalent pathway model;
! must have a financially strong and fully committed Sponsoring Tribe;
! investments from other tribes may not materialize.
! concept perception may be tainted by prior history of “off-shore”
banks;
! requires FinTech partnering to implement technology platforms;
! fear of tribal sovereignty/immunity on the part of potential non-tribal
partners;
! tribal deposits may require FDIC insurance, adding to administrative
burden;
! tribes may be reluctant to work together due to competing economic
interests; and
! likely requires co-regulation regime with U.S. government for
legitimacy.
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Opportunities
! service to increasing numbers of Native-owned businesses;
! ability to bank emerging commerce such as legal cannabis and online
gaming;
! become bank of choice for 200+ tribal casinos.
! establish TCB as one-stop-shop for accessing federal loan guarantee
programs;
! “corner the market” for development financing to Native American
nations;
! partnerships with innovative FinTech companies readily available;
! perfect model for banking emerging block chain currencies such as
Bitcoin;
! pro-business regulation from Tribal Banking Commission to entice
new customers;
! some existing banks may switch their charter to the Tribal Banking
Commission; and
! will be high-profile endeavor that can generate significant free positive
publicity.

Threats
! effort may be viewed as an attempt to skirt U.S. banking laws, rules
and regulations;
! failure to create a legally viable and operationally sound Tribal
Banking Code;
! inability to appoint expert personnel to Tribal Banking Commission;
! inability to hire necessary tech/marketing experts to implement TCB
services;
! inability to obtain FDIC insurance and/or co-regulation agreement;
! inability to obtain Federal Reserve Bank Master Account Number;
! U.S. banking community may react negatively and attack the effort;
! U.S. government refuses to co-regulate legal cannabis/online gaming
accounts; and
! U.S./global banking laws may conflict with TCB code provisions.

Like any new concept and effort, the idea of the TCB system may
encounter resistance and face rejection for its unprecedented nature. All
systems and organizations are resistant to change. This is especially true in
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banking and with respect to bank regulation and supervision. Given the new
and unique nature of the TCB concept, detailed examination of the
“Threats” and inherent challenges of the program is warranted in order to
ensure a realistic assessment of the potential for success.
G. Challenges of the Tribally Chartered Bank
Personnel/Governance. One major practical challenge to establishing a
functional Tribal Banking Commission and TCB is attracting experienced,
successful banking professionals with impeccable banking credentials. Such
professionals are a sine qua non to the bank regulatory community granting
de facto accreditation to the Tribal Banking Commission and the TCB.
Many successful and established banking professionals of high reputational
regard may be reluctant to be associated with the concept for fear that it
may be, or will become, viewed as a rogue or outside-the-law operation.
Amending the U.S. “dual banking system” to include Tribally Chartered
Banks. From its very foundation, the United States has embraced a “dual
banking system,” i.e., heretofore only banks chartered by either a state
banking department or a federal bank regulatory body have existed. The
concept of a TCB will thus upset and disrupt a static banking system with a
history of over 230 years. The inertia of the extant banking system in the
United States is deeply engrained and highly resistant to change. The
advent of TCBs will necessitate far-reaching and very broad changes and
adjustments of state and federal banking laws, rules, and regulations. Such
adjustments will likely not come easily or quickly, and will require TCB
stakeholders to engage in an effective campaign with officials of the federal
government.
Weakening of Anti-Money Laundering Efforts. Another practical
challenge facing the TCB is the perception that such banks could weaken
existing anti-money laundering efforts across the United States and
worldwide banking systems. For several decades there have been increasing
intergovernmental efforts to combat illegal activities by taking steps to
prevent or inhibit the use of the banking systems to move money for
unlawful purposes. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 directly led
to the passage of the PATRIOT Act in the United States and to similar
legislation worldwide. These laws put additional emphasis upon anti-money
laundering efforts to combat terrorism financing.109 The TCB chartered
109. See Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism – Topics, INT’L
MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml1.htm (last visited
Jan. 18, 2017).
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bank may suffer from significant reputational risk as a potential back door
to escape such heightened bank regulatory supervision, and will need to
clearly demonstrate its transparency and legitimacy as a new partner in
curbing unlawful activity.
Reputational Risks. Yet another practical obstacle is the reputational risk
of the TCB. The present reality and history of tribally owned banks reflects
a very checkered past. On the surface, this history reflects poorly on the
tribes involved with such efforts and thus could negatively affect public
perceptions of any tribal efforts to establish a TCB. This public perception
is primed by the notion of the reservation-based “off-shore bank.”110 This
idea has been widely promoted over the years as a way to offer the
traditional Swiss-style secrecy and numbered accounts on a United States
domestic basis through Indian tribes. Those involved in such regrettable
efforts were members of the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma and the Delaware
Nation of Oklahoma. Both tribes launched efforts in the 1990s to create
banks imbued with tribal sovereignty, and both efforts ended in ignominy,
prison sentences for some, and very bad public relations for the tribes.111
These and similar efforts have to some extent poisoned the waters for tribes
who wish to create a TCB in a responsible and legally compliant manner.
At least in the near term, the prior experience of such tribal banking
institutions may prove to be an extremely difficult challenge to
overcome.112
The Difficulty of Achieving Comity for the Tribally Chartered Bank.
There is a possibility that the current bank regulatory infrastructure in the
United States will resist and deny the concept of a TCB. TCB stakeholders
will likely need to make a tremendous effort for the community of state and
federal bank regulators to recognize the authority of a Tribal Banking
Commission. Further, a United States Supreme Court ruling and/or an act
of Congress may prove necessary to grant comity to the Tribal Banking

110. Tribe Offers First Offshore Bank, INDEP. REC. (Helena, Mont.) (Jan. 17, 2000),
http://helenair.com/news/state-and-regional/tribe-offers-first-offshore-bank/article_86afb60c3d1e-5fdd-8336-7c9642d33de4.html.
111. John Parker, Indian ‘Bank’ Founders Convicted of Fraud, Deceiving Tribe,
NEWSOK.COM (Apr. 30, 1999, 12:00 AM CDT), http://newsok.com/article/2651551; Dana
Attocknie, Delaware Nation Citizens Question Leadership, Election Commission, NATIVE
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.nativetimes.com/index.php/news/tribal/7582-delawarenation-citizens-question-leadership-election-commission.
112. Dan Rutherford, Tribal Bank Bypasses FDIC, Has Own Rules on Deposit, TULSA
WORLD (Mar. 22, 1997, 12:00 AM)), http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/tribal-bankbypasses-fdic-has-own-rules-on-deposit/article_28b4a9e9-2378-5f78-ada5-2cbfc14745a0.html.
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Commission and to allow a TBC to integrate into the existing global
financial systems.
Obtaining FDIC Insurance and Federal Reserve Bank Master Account
Number. Even if the concept of a TCB becomes recognized via U.S.
Supreme Court ruling or an act of Congress, additional obstacles remain.
Although it is legally possible for most any organized group to apply for
either a state or federal banking charter, that does not mean that all
applicants will actually receive such charter. Each bank regulatory agency
will thoroughly review the bank charter application and assess the risks
posed by the business plan of such application. Many applications are
denied because of the perception of undue business risks, lack of qualified
personnel in the proposed bank, insufficient capital, and/or potential
illegality in the operations of the enterprise.113 Accordingly, even if the
Tribal Banking Commission approves a tribal banking charter that does not
mean the FDIC will approve the charter for deposit insurance or that the
Federal Reserve will approve the charter for the issuance of a Federal
Reserve Bank master account number.
Both FDIC insurance and a Federal Reserve Bank master account
number are indispensable components to any bank and are viewed as its
lifeblood.114 The power to grant these attributes lies totally outside the
control of the Tribal Banking Commission and could prove to be the
Achilles’ heel of the concept.
Inability to Attract Investment Capital. In an environment of legal and/or
regulatory uncertainty with respect to the concept, the organizers of a TCB
may not be able to attract sufficient capital for launching and sustaining
operations. Potential investors may feel that the legal and regulatory
environment is too uncertain or tenuous, thus show reluctance to invest the
millions of dollars necessary to adequately capitalize a TCB. This concern
may also extend to possible perceptions of lax regulation by the Tribal
Banking Commission that could give rise to fears that invested capital may
be inefficiently applied or siphoned off via unlawful or imprudent
management acts.
Fears of Opening “Pandora’s Box”. Another practical threat to the TCB
concept is fear among bankers and bank regulatory agencies that
113. Nathaniel Popper, Banking for Pot Industry Hits a Roadblock, N.Y. TIMES (July 30,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/business/dealbook/federal-reserve-denies-creditunion-for-cannabis.html.
114. See FIRST NAT’L BANK, THE IMPORTANCE OF FDIC INSURANCE, https://www.the
first.com/uploadedFiles/THE_FIRST/Images/FDIC%20article.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
2017).
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recognizing and granting comity to one Tribal Banking Commission and
one TCB will open the doors to a flood of similar efforts by many of the
hundreds of federally recognized tribes.115 While there are only fifty-three
extant bank regulatory agencies in the United States today (fifty state bank
agencies and three federal bank agencies), there could potentially be
hundreds of tribal bank regulatory agencies and perhaps thousands of
TCBs. Establishing the procedures and logistical structure to ensure
uniformity of quality, laws, rules, regulations, policies and procedures will
be paramount. Fears of opening a “Pandora’s Box” of widespread TCB
activity may combine with a lack of federal will or resources and stall the
concept.
These hardships persist in Native American nations despite repeated
attempts to modify the existing finance system to ameliorate such
conditions, and despite various federal government interventions into the
capital markets and financial system designed to improve conditions in
tribal communities. Although well-intended, federal efforts, such as the
BIA Loan Guaranty program, consistently fall short in addressing tribal
needs.116 For example, Senator Al Franken described the paucity of funding
from the program as “embarrassing.”117 Moreover, the United States
Special Trustee for American Indians Vincent G. Logan has stated: “When
we talk about economic development, I always tell all the people that I
work with: credit is how the world was built. We are not going to get very
far” unless they have access to credit.118
The lack of financial systems within Native American nations persists
despite SWOT analysis indicating that the Tribally Chartered Bank risks are
outweighed by the opportunity to fulfill an urgent and substantial need for
credit and capital among Native American nations. The inherent challenges
of creating a new financial system dictate that successful implementation of
the TCB will require: focused efforts and investment by one or more tribal

115. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019 (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2016-01-29/pdf/2016-01769.pdf.
116. See Appendix (statement of Sen. Al Franken).
117. Id.
118. See Foster Pepper PLLC Videos, Native American Colloquium: Native American
Development and U.S./Tribal Relations, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2015) [hereinafter Logan
Address], https://youtu.be/H9Ru4hVsyJM (address by Vincent G. Logan, U.S. special
trustee for American Indians, at University of Washington Tribal Development Colloquium,
Seattle, May 28, 2015).
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governments, beneficial partnership with advanced FinTech firms, and a
collaborative inter-governmental relationship with the United States.
V. Policy Recommendations and Next Steps
The TCB presents an opportunity to create an innovative financial
institution that can directly address and improve the access-to-capital
conditions for Native American nations and their members. The TCB
would also facilitate the delivery of the “patient capital” needed for longterm economic, infrastructure, and community development in tribal
communities. “Patient” capital is not unprofitable capital—a TCB must be
profitable to sustain its operations. However, a TCB need not continually
and exclusively chase the highest possible profit margin, nor should it
abandon the financing of lower-margin but socially beneficial activities. A
TCB can maintain a long-term view of capital productivity consistent with
the “seven generations” concept, rather than a short-term focus on meeting
the quarterly expectations of outside financial analysts.119 Notably, a TCB
can prioritize projects that meet the urgent needs of the most overlooked
communities.
The next steps for bringing the TCB to fruition involve policy actions by
the tribal government(s) such as:
! drafting TCB governance codes that embody consistency,
transparency, cogent dispute resolution mechanisms, and robust
oversight;
! investing in partnerships with FinTech companies to create
electronic payment infrastructure; and
! Presenting a workable cooperative regulatory oversight plan to
U.S. finance authorities.
The U.S. government, via a corollary set of policy actions, will facilitate
the implementation of the TCB program by:
! providing technical assistance for integrating the TCB into
existing domestic and global electronic payment networks;
119. “The Peacemaker taught us about the Seven Generations. He said, when you sit in
council for the welfare of the people, you must not think of yourself or of your family, not
even of your generation. He said, make your decisions on behalf of the seven generations
coming, so that they may enjoy what you have today.” Oren Lyons (Seneca), Faith keeper,
Onondaga Nation, quoted in Seven Generations – The Role of Chief, PBS.ORG, http://www.
pbs.org/warrior/content/timeline/opendoor/roleOfChief.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
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! designing a clear path of required actions for the TCB to obtain
FDIC insurance for future depository accounts;
! working proactively to implement a cooperative regulatory
oversight regime; and
! providing guidance and resources to establish electronic security
and fraud-prevention best practices for the TCB.
Two key elements for launching the TCB initiative are obtaining an
initial “critical mass” of support among tribal nations and attaining
agreement among credible leaders to manage the program’s creation. To
obtain federal cooperation, tribes must first demonstrate the commitment,
knowledge, and willingness to invest in the program and create the legal
and operational infrastructure. In order to build this support, the academic
community can take an active role in facilitating meetings and discussion
among tribal leaders, utilizing in person networking and real-time electronic
participation models similar to the University of Washington’s 2015 Tribal
Development Colloquium.120 Partnering with trans-tribal entities such as the
National Congress of American Indians and the First Nations Development
Institute can assist in bringing key leaders into the discussion, and help
identify appropriate divisions of labor among participating tribes based on
relative institutional strengths, resources, and administrative capabilities.
The TCB represents a game-changing paradigm shift in that it: (1)
disrupts the 240-year model in the United States of the “dual banking
system” (i.e., only state or federal charters) by creating a tribally chartered
bank system; (2) is a public policy innovation arising locally and
organically from tribal communities to intervene in the capital markets to
address their well-documented and chronic lack of access to financial
services and capital; (3) represents a commitment to robust bank regulation
120. In May 2015 the University of Washington’s Jackson School of International
Studies hosted a two-day colloquium focused on Native American sovereignty,
development, and human security. The Colloquium provided an exploration of the mutual
sovereignty dynamic between the United States and Native American nations, with a
particular focus on innovative policies for institutional development, economic growth, and
social cohesiveness in Native American nations. The program featured national tribal leaders
and subject matter experts from a broad spectrum of development backgrounds including
governance, economics, law, education, health, and culture. Video recordings and
presentation materials for the full colloquium are accessible at no charge via Sovereignty,
Development and Human Security: A Colloquium on United States and Native American
Relations, FOSTER PEPPER (May 28, 2015), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/
search?q=cache:whvt2kYm1-wJ:www.foster.com/resources/events/sovereignty,-develop
ment-and-human-security-a-coll+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
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and supervision married to a “pro-business” environment that welcomes
and embraces innovations in financial processes and technology; and (4)
assimilates and distributes “patient” capital for long-term economic,
community, and social development in Indian Country. The United States
Special Trustee for American Indians Vincent G. Logan has succinctly
stated the mutual foundation that underlies contemporary Native American
development: “We know that economic development and the relationship
between the [United States] and tribal nations—it all depends upon getting
the right pieces into place.”121 The TCB provides a unique platform for the
United States and tribal governments to collaborate and construct a
“missing piece” within the network of existing financial institutions, and
launch a purpose-driven vehicle for enhancing access to the capital that is
essential for Native American socio-economic development.

121. Logan Address, supra note 116.
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APPENDIX
United States Senate Oversight Hearing122
Selected Witness Testimony: Accessing Capital in Indian Country
The following excerpts are quotes from the June 17, 2015 testimony of
the indicated witnesses appearing at the United States Senate Oversight
Hearing on Accessing Capital in Indian Country. They highlight the issues
and challenges that impact the accessibility of development capital for
Native American nations.
Senator Michael Crapo (R-Idaho):
Regardless of location, access to capital is one of the most
important fundamentals of business and economic development.
....
We know the challenges that Indian Country faces in
accessing essential business resources are significant. In fact,
some of our witnesses today have noted in their testimonies that
Native people are most underserved demographic in terms of
access to capital.123
Alejandra Castillo,
Development Agency:

National

Director,

Minority

Business

Access to capital continues to be the number one impediment
for Native businesses and other minority businesses.
By any socioeconomic indicator, Native Americans are the
most underserved population in the Country. This means that
financial literacy, credit history and access to lending institutions
on or near Native lands may be lower than in other areas of the
Country.124

122. See Hearing: Accessing Capital, supra note 83; see also Andrew Bahl, Senate
Committee Focuses on Access to Capital in Indian Country, INDIANZ.COM (June 18, 2015),
http://www.indianz.com/News/2015/017889.asp.
123. Hearing: Accessing Capital, supra note 83, at 2.
124. Id. at 3.
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Derek Watchman, Chair, National Center for American Indian
Enterprise Development:
Lower margin projects and start-ups are always challenging to
finance.
Infrastructure projects, which are badly needed in Indian
Country, are very hard to finance, especially if there is limited
Federal funding or because tribes have little tax base[.] [I]t is
hard to do bonds based on limited tax bases. Tribes themselves,
however, are increasing access to capital through self-financing
of their business and economic development projects. . . .
That is why the National Congress of American Indians and
NAFOA have repeatedly urged Congress to improve and
increase the allocations to the BIA loan guarantee program.
Right now it is set at $7 million.125
Senator Al Franken (D-Minnesota):
I was hearing that the BIA Loan Guarantee Program is
underfunded. Mr. Hill just talked about it being badly
administered. It is hard to get more funding for a program that is
badly administered.
What I am hearing is that $7 million is next to nothing and
sort of embarrassing, I think. . . .
. . . There are bands of tribes in my State that have a great
need for capital. Because of that, they would be considered a
high credit risk but that is exactly why they need capital. . . .
....
. . . The need in Indian Country is so great. I wonder
sometimes, the tribes that need it the most, need economic
development the most, are probably the worst credit risks in a
sense . . . .
I just want to make sure that the bands that need it the most
get the opportunity to do economic development on their land

125. Id. at 8-9.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss1/1

No. 1]

CREATING A SOVEREIGN FINANCIAL SYSTEM

because they have such high unemployment rates. They need
something and they need it the most.126
Ross Hill, CEO, Bank2:
The BIA Commercial Loan Guarantee Program is truly the
only guaranteed loan program that can be widely used for nearly
any need on tribal lands. The program could become a vital
source of growth and development of Native America . . . .
[But] [t]ypically, it is funded about 20 to 30 percent of the
maximum authorization. This year is a prime example of the
problem. The BIA is already out of commitment authority. . . .
....
. . . [B]ut perhaps as many as 200,000 homes are still needed
on reservations alone. The economic impact of satisfying this
need could reach as much as $40 billion on the U.S. and Indian
Country economies.
Think of this to picture that. The City of New Orleans has
200,000 homes. The demand is high, the need is great and the
opportunity for real economic impact is unquestionable.
....
. . . The [BIA Loan Guarantee] program is not adequately
funded, nor is it administrated properly.
....
. . . The BIA is not very accountable to their customer or to
the banks. Their process for approval is subject to individual
offices and subject to different edicts handed down from
Washington from time to time. The process is not one that can be
counted on, nor is it one that can be counted on in a timely basis.
....
. . . [W]e cannot close a transaction and get a guarantee on the
loan. Without the BIA addressing this problem and making it a
serious matter . . . most loans will not be completed and funded
that could be.

126. Id. at 38, 39, 44.
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....
. . . I believe there is just a lack of commitment at the BIA
office to remedy the problem.127
Dante Desiderio, Executive Director, Native American Finance
Officers Association:
While the need for capital to flow freely into Indian Country is
great, existing Federal capital programs have failed to drive
economic growth and development that is profoundly needed in
Indian County. We think it is time to take a different look at
these programs and ask ourselves why they are not working to
reach their full potential.
. . . The first program is the Indian Loan Guarantee
Program. . . . [T]he program is not reaching its potential because
the total amount of Federal funds budgeted is around $7 million
or $8 million for all of Indian Country.
. . . Treasury set aside the Native program from the larger
CDFI [Community Development Financial Institution]
program. . . . The program works but again, its entire budget is
around $15 million for all of Indian Country.
. . . We have 70 Native CDFIs that if you average it out, it is
about $200,000 each, which is not enough for technical
assistance and loans.
....
Tribal governments are much different and need much longer
term capital, much more patient capital. We do not have the
ability to go to the market and raise equity, so we rely on long
term, patient capital to grow enterprises. It is a much different
role.
The tribal governments are looking at those enterprises to
fund programs and services. . . .
....
. . . [And] the long term patient capital is needed to build the
infrastructure and the tribal businesses to provide those program
127. Id. at 18, 37, 39, 42.
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services, even the telecommunications infrastructure that is
needed for business development.128
Senator Jon Tester (D-Montana):
I think access to capital in Indian Country is an incredible
inhibitor to increase the economy and reduce poverty, and
reduce the necessity for the safety net programs at the Federal
level.129
[O]pportunities will go for naught if tribal economies are
struggling – forcing children to take their skills and find jobs
elsewhere. . . . We can’t let that happen. Our First Americans
should not have to choose between making a good living away
from their family and homelands or living in poverty.130

128. Id. at 28, 29, 37, 38.
129. Id. at 42.
130. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, Tester Remains Committed to
Finding a Path to Improving Economic Conditions Across Indian Country (June 25, 2014),
http://www.indian.senate.gov/news/press-release/access-capital-remote-locations-stymieeconomic-growth-indian-country.
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